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Introduction1
One of the best-known characteristics of hypermodernity is speed. It is true 
that authors like Paul Virilio2 had already underscored the importance of speed 
in order to understand our times as early as in the 1970s. But at those times (still 
postmodern times?) speed was mainly connected to the use of analogic technolo-
gies, like television or airplanes, as Alan N. Shapiro3 has pointed out; whereas in 
hypermodern times speed is connected mostly to the use of digital technologies, 
like computers and the Internet.
This hypermodern alliance of speed and digital technologies explains, among 
others, the incredibly short time that it takes for some new words to become 
widely known and used on a global scale. This is what has happened to the term 
“post-truth”, which was elevated to the rank of “Word of the year” by Oxford 
Dictionaries in 2016. There was no record of this term before 1980, according to 
1 This paper is based in the contribution “Post-Truth as a Feature of Hypermodern Times”, that 
I presented at the conference Around Hypermodernism, held at the Faculty “Artes Liberales” of 
the University of Warsaw on June 14, 2018. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 expand a shorter version of 
them that I already published in section 3.6. of my book Sapere aude, o ¿cabe llamarnos aún 
ilustrados?, Valladolid 2018.
2 P. Virilio, Vitesse et Politique: essai de dromologie, Paris 1977.
3 A.N. Shapiro, What is hyper-modernism?, keynote lecture at the same-named conference held at 
the National Center of Scientific Research (CNRS) in Paris, March 20th, 2016, http://www.alan-
shapiro.com/what-is-hyper-modernism-by-alan-n-shapiro.
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Google Books Ngram Viewer. We had to wait till 1992, though, to see the first use 
of this expression with approximately the same meaning that we ascribe to it to-
day.4 Twelve years after that, Ralph Keyes published his book The Post-truth Era,5 
which definitely contributed to the popularization of the word. Nevertheless, the 
increase of its use followed a slow pace till the first months of 2016. It was from 
June 2016 onwards that it experienced a sudden boost, as the so-called Brexit ref-
erendum was taking place and the United States presidential election campaign 
was reaching its peak.6 This rapid surge can only be understood in a world con-
nected through the internet: many languages experienced it at the same time.7
Now, just as the internet contributes to making fashionable words like this 
quite fast, it also seems to require us to understand them quickly. This is the rea-
son why no small number of those who read the word “post-truth” have felt the 
compulsion, I am afraid, of immediately giving it a meaning. And I guess that 
they have reasoned (more or less) like this: if post-truth is clearly not the same as 
truth, and the opposite of “truth” is “lie”, let us swiftly conclude that “post-truth” 
is nothing but a new label for the lies of yore (which, for some obscure reasons, 
have now this new trendy name).
This way of reasoning is, nevertheless, wrong. The term “post-truth” has an 
inescapable philosophical component (in fact, as we will try to argue here, its 
current success is of little surprise to those who have paid close attention to the 
developments of philosophy for the last forty years or so). And philosophy re-
quires slow reflection, not the desire to understand as soon as possible any new 
fad. Post-truth is not the same as lying. Quite diverse philosophers like Mario 
Perniola, Gianni Vattimo and Harry Frankfurt have been warning us that this 
was going to happen, that we were entering into a post-truth world. These three 
4 S. Tesich, A Government of Lies, “The Nation”, 1992, January 6/13, pp. 12–14.
5 R. Keyes, The Post-Truth Era. Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life, New York 2004.
6 Data taken from Oxford Dictionaries, Word of the year 2016 is…, https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016.
7 In Spanish, the word “posverdad” was accepted by the Dictionary of the Royal Academy in 
December 2017, but it had already been used since 2003 (L. Verdú, El prisionero de las 21.30, 
Barcelona 2003). In French, “post-verité” was introduced at Le Petit Larousse and Le Robert il-
lustré in June 2017. In German, “postfaktisch” was elected as word of the year in December 2016 
by the Gesellschaft für deutsche Sprache (GfdS). In Italian, the Accademia della Crusca had 
been studying the term “post-verità” since the end of 2016 (M. Biffi: “Viviamo nell’epoca della 
post-verità?”, Accademia della Crusca, 25 November 2016, http://www.accademiadellacrusca.it/
it/lingua-italiana/consulenza-linguistica/domande-risposte/viviamo-nellepoca-post-verit).
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philosophers have used different languages, they belong to different philosophi-
cal traditions, they have different feelings about the coming of the age of post-
truth, each of them pays special attention to one or another of its causes and of its 
consequences. But none of them has trivialized our subject matter to the point of 
stating that all that was going on is that people were going to tell lies to a greater 
extent than ever before.
What does, then, “post-truth” mean, if it is not just “lying”? Let us follow the 
steps of the three above-mentioned philosophers: they will help us to get clear 
about this. But we can advance something: post-truth is not a new word for fal-
sity, but a word that describes the times (our times) in which the difference be-
tween truth and falsity is not relevant any more. The history of philosophy is full 
of thinkers (Antique and Modern) who have strained to show us the way to truth 
and how to get rid of falsehoods; the new phenomenon that post-truth represents 
is that this whole epistemic endeavor is not solicited any longer.
Harry Frankfurt: post-truth as bullshit
In 1986 an American philosopher teaching at Yale, Harry Frankfurt, pub-
lished a paper about the notion of “bullshit”.8 It did not achieve world-wide suc-
cess till nineteen years later, though, when it was re-published as a small book un-
der the same explicit title: On Bullshit.9 The text is interesting for us here because 
our contention is that what Frankfurt calls “bullshit” is similar to what we have 
called “post-truth”. And this maybe explains why a work published in the 1980s 
had to wait till 2005 to be widely appreciated and understood.
Frankfurt’s purpose in that essay was two-fold. First, he made a diagnosis of 
our times (overcoming the usual reluctancy of analytic Anglo-Saxon philoso-
phers to making general statements about our era). He detected that we live in 
times in which bullshit is having a great success (although he recognized that we 
don’t know if “there is relatively more of it nowadays than at other times. There 
is more communication of all kinds in our time than ever before, but the propor-
tion that is bullshit may not have increased”10). In the second place, he gave a def-
8 H. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, “Raritan Quarterly Review” 1986, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 81–100.
9 H. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, Princeton 2005.
10 Ibid. p. 62.
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inition of the blunt word that he used in the title of his work. To do so, he made 
a sharp distinction between bullshitting and lying, along the lines that we have 
drawn before to distinguish between post-truth and lying. A liar is interested in 
truth and she wants you to believe in the general distinction between truth and 
falsity: she just wants you to believe as true something that is not (her lie). But, 
in our times, bullshitters are not interested in convincing you of one or another 
statement (true or false). They just want to talk with complete indifference to how 
things really are. And they want their audience to also be indifferent to what is 
true or not in their speech. The purpose of the bullshitter is not to convince her 
audience of new “truths”; it is just to get that audience uninterested on whether 
all that they are told is true or not.
The era of bullshit is then an era of general unresponsiveness to truth: a post-
truth era. Although Frankfurt did not use this term, it corresponds neatly to the 
meaning that the journalist Steve Tesich was going to give to it in 1992, just six 
years after Frankfurt’s original publication. Tesich was gloomily conscious of the 
dark consequences that this triumph of bullshit, this loss of the significance of 
truth, this new post-truth world, could have:
We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a  people that totalitarian monsters 
could only drool about in their dreams. All the dictators up to now have had 
to work hard at suppressing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that 
this is no longer necessary, that we have acquired a spiritual mechanism that 
can denude truth of any significance. In a very fundamental way we, as a free  
people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world.11
Frankfurt is not so clear as Tesich is, though, in asserting that this unrespon-
siveness to truth constitutes a “decision”. In fact, mere carelessness is, according 
to him, the main cause of such an unresponsiveness. The bullshitter’s fault “is not 
that she fails to get things right, but that she is not even trying”.12 “It is just this 
lack of connection to a concern with truth—this indifference to how things re-
ally are—that I regard as of the essence of bullshit”.13 Anyway, along with Tesich, 
Frankfurt recognized “that bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are”.14 
But, against Tesich again, he points out that it is precisely democracy (not a new 
11 S. Tesich, A Government of Lies, “The Nation”, 1992, January 6/13, pp. 12–14.
12 H. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, Princeton 2005, p. 32.
13 Ibid. pp. 33–34.
14 Ibid. p. 61.
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kind of “dictatorship”) what stimulates bullshitting; i.e. “the widespread convic-
tion that it is the responsibility of a citizen in a democracy to have opinions about 
everything, or at least everything that pertains to the conduct of his country’s 
affairs”.15 Other instances that could explain the success of bullshit (or post-
truth) in our times are, according to his book, a generalization of skepticism, in 
the first place (if we don’t know the truth, then an indifference to it seems a good 
reaction).16 And, secondly, the currently prevalent praise of the virtue of sincer-
ity17 above correctness (“let us be true to ourselves and stop trying to be true to 
the facts”).
Frankfurt was not sympathetic neither to that skepticism nor to the cor-
responding aspiration to be “sincere” about ourselves: why should we get facts 
about ourselves better than facts in general?, he asks himself at the end of his 
text. In sum, he was in no way optimistic about a world in which bullshit, or 
post-truth, was prevailing. Interestingly, though, at the very same years in which 
he was dealing with these problems in Connecticut, another philosopher many 
miles away, in Northern Italy, was also working on them. But he was doing so 
from a significantly more optimistic outlook. His name was Gianni Vattimo. 
Gianni Vattimo: post-truth, nihilism and the media
The pessimistic stance detectable both in Frankfurt and Tesich towards post-
truth was absent from Gianni Vattimo’s first edition of his book The transparent 
society18 in 1989. Nevertheless, he identified a similar phenomenon in our culture 
to the one noticed by both Americans. A phenomenon that he did not call “post-
truth” neither, but that clearly corresponded to its above explained meaning.
There were other significant differences between Frankfurt and Vattimo: 
instead of Wittgenstein or Saint Augustine (two of the philosophers that the 
American philosopher had made use of in his essay), Vattimo established a dia-
15 Ibid. pp. 63–64. This problem gets even bigger when that “citizen in a  democracy” feels the 
compulsion to have opinions in each and every world political affair, as Frankfurt remarks im-
mediately after; something that may help us understand the success of some of the geopolitical 
tactics that we will mention in section 6 of this paper.
16 Ibid. p. 64.
17 Ibid. p. 65.
18 G. Vattimo, La società trasparente, Milan 1989.
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logue with Nietzsche and Heidegger. Instead of being as cautious as Frankfurt 
on whether there is more unconcern for truth today than in the past, Vattimo 
plainly stated that there is: we are living in the times of accomplished nihilism, 
according to him (and Nietzsche),19 times characterized by this lack of concern 
towards absolute or factual truths. And instead of just democracy, skepticism or 
an exaggerated tribute to sincerity (the forces leading to post-truth that Frank-
furt had identified), Vattimo emphasized another force as the main stimulus for 
the triumph of post-truth (and nihilism): the heroes (or the villains) of his story 
were the media. 
His vision was somewhat prophetic. Let us remember that in 1989 the inter-
net as we know it was still a work in progress: the first proposal for a world wide 
web (by Tim Berners-Lee) originated that very year, and its code was not written 
until the year after. Nevertheless, Vattimo was already able to envision a world 
very similar to today’s world of the internet and social networks: a world where 
each person would just read the newspapers (or posts), watch the TV channels (or 
youtubers), listen to the radio stations (or podcasts) that hold positions similar to 
her own. A world, in sum, where less and less common references hold the people 
of one country together: there are too many media to find a shared ground for 
most citizens. This means that each person ends up living in a different world 
than their neighbor. And thus, a common notion of truth is not interesting any 
more: each group has its own notion of it, unresponsive to any shared criterion. 
Each group lives in its own post-truth environment. In fact, Vattimo was already 
describing what two decades afterwards would be called “cyberghettos”20 (groups 
of people that only consume media whose worldview coincides with their own 
settled worldview). Vattimo was describing our present world.
Now, as we have mentioned earlier, Vattimo’s judgement of this phenomenon 
was initially positive. He thought that a world in which each person may freely 
choose their own truths was an unheard-of paradise of freedom. “If we lose the 
‘sense of reality’ with this multiplication of world images, this loss is not a big deal 
19 G. Vattimo and P. Paterlini, Non essere Dio. Un’autobiografia a quattro mani, Reggio Emilia 2006, 
p. 108.
20 See T.J. Johnson, S.L. Bichard &  W. Zhang, Communication Communities or ‘Cyberghettos?’: 
A Path Analysis Model Examining Factors that Explain Selective Exposure to Blogs, “Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication” 2009, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 60–82. In explicit connection 
with post-truth, Lee McIntyre has used the expression “information silos” for the same phe-
nomenon (L. McIntyre, Post-Truth, Cambridge MA 2018).
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after all”, he wrote, because it has “an emancipatory reach, a liberating reach”.21 
We are now free to choose our truths: is not it the height of freedom? Vattimo 
connects this “loss of the sense of reality” and this enjoyment of a  myriad of 
“truths” to Nietzsche’s nihilism, and nihilism also acquires in this way a positive 
face. Plus, using a Foucaultian concept, Vattimo added that this fragmentation of 
“truths” allowed the free pursuit of partial, group-limited “heterotopias”, instead 
of the typical (and dangerous) dogmatic notions of universal utopias, oppressive 
models to which all of us should ideally submit.22
Anyhow, Vattimo’s quite enthusiastic approval of this world of heterotopias, 
cyberghettos or post-truth would dramatically change just a  few years after-
wards. In his prologue and new last chapter23 to the reedition of this book in 
2000, he recognized that maybe the media had not exercised all the “emancipa-
tory” and “liberating” role that he had previously ascribed to them. What had 
happened in between to cause this change of mind? Vattimo explicitly referred to 
“new problems (especially political problems)”.24 Political history tells us that the 
rise of the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi as Italy’s new prime minister, in 1994, 
might be behind Vattimo’s new diffidence towards the media and their ability to 
create alternative realities. After all, post-truth had shown itself to be a good ally 
for right-wing populism,25 and this unexpected effect was in no way congenial to 
Vattimo’s aspirations.
Anyway, everything that Vattimo modified then was his previous (positive) 
personal assessment of our post-truth times and of the role of the media in them; 
he still held to the philosophical idea that we were losing “a sense of reality” and 
entering a myriad of heterotopias, that we were entering a post-truth world.26 Let 
us now turn our attention to the fact that yet another Italian philosopher joined 
21 G. Vattimo, La società trasparente, Milan 2000, p. 16.
22 Ibid. pp. 84–100. In spite of the relevance of Michel Foucault in bringing the notion of “hetero-
topia” to philosophical attention in the 1960s, Vattimo does not quote him in this text. He relies 
instead in philosophers like Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger (as usual), this time in 
the company of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Wilhelm Dilthey. See more on the possible perils 
implied in universal ideals at M.Á. Quintana-Paz, L’universalismo di alcuni filosofi morali con-
temporanei (e le curiose idee dei drusi sui cinesi), “Filosofia e questioni pubbliche”, No. 2, 2005, 
pp. 75–102.
23 Ibid, pp. 3–4, 101–121. 
24 Ibid. p. 4.
25 We will see more on this possibility in section 6 of this paper.
26 “The philosophical background [of my position] is not undermined”. Ibid.
Miguel Ángel Quintana-Paz
150
him (and Frankfurt) in this diagnosis: another University of Turin alumnus, 
whose name was Mario Perniola. 
Mario Perniola: post-truth and communication
A professor of Aesthetics in Rome since 1983 and a former Situationist, Mario 
Perniola was at least as aware as Vattimo of the new world towards which the new 
media were leading us. It was already in 1986 that he was able to describe the kind 
of communities that the internet would create many years afterwards.27 Never-
theless, and this is an important difference with Vattimo, he never celebrated the 
arrival of a world in which truth would lose relevance (a post-truth world). He 
always maintained a stern attitude to this new circumstance, evident especially 
in his last works.28
There are two main sources of this new situation, according to Perniola. One 
of them is “communication”. Perniola uses this term in a quite derisive way: for 
him, it reflects an absolute unconcern for how things really are, substituted by 
a concern for talking and talking just for the sake of it. In other words, Perniola 
is using “communication” in a  similar way to the use that Frankfurt made of 
“bullshit”, and to the use that we are making here of “post-truth”. And, like Vat-
timo, he contends that the media, and their communicative role, are one of the 
most apparent places in which this carelessness for truth may be seen.
A second important source that explains our current situation for Perniola is 
anti-intellectualism. He identified in the “revolution” of May 1968, and its large 
shadow over us, a  paramount example of this anti-intellectualist movement. 
When students in Paris wrote on the walls things like “Read less, live more!”, 
when they wanted to abolish universities and when some authors, like Ivan Illich, 
aspired to a general deschooling29 of society, they were paving the way to a world 
(our world) in which intellectuals, scholars, experts and knowledge in general 
27 M. Perniola, “Urbano, più-che-urbano”, in: Presa diretta. Estetica e politica, Venice 1986, 
pp. 151–160. Some years ago, I had the chance of asking Perniola how it was possible for him in 
the 1980s to foresee internet communities, before the invention of the world wide web. “Oh, it 
was all too obvious at that time” he told me with a humble look.
28 M. Perniola, Contro la comunicazione, Turin 2004; M. Perniola, Berlusconi o  il ‘68 realizzato, 
Milan 2011.
29 I. Illich, Deschooling Society, New York 1971.
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would have less and less prominence. And when we throw experts out, we also 
throw expertise out. When we don’t care about what knowledgeable experts say 
anymore, we confess that we don’t care about the knowledge of truth anymore. 
A post-intellectual world is a post-truth world. 
According to Perniola, this posits us in a completely new situation in Western 
history. In our past, even quite irrational movements, like Nazism, aspired to 
have some special kind of connection with truth: they had their own intellec-
tuals, their own experts, their own cultural standards.30 “Even though hostility 
towards culture is not completely new in the history of Western legacy, it has 
never been an issue of primary importance”.31 If we should want to find a similar 
disrespect for intellectuals and truth in the past, we would have to look East: 
in China experts (mandarins) had been for centuries alternating between the 
highest respect of their contemporaries and the deepest hatred of their fellow 
citizens.32 Perniola was not optimistic about a Western world that imitates today 
those darkest ages of Chinese history. Perniola, in sum, was not optimistic about 
our post-truth world.
Gilles Lipovetsky: hyperindividualism, hyperconsumption  
and post-truth
Now, after seeing how Frankfurt, Vattimo and Perniola made their respective 
diagnosis of post-truth as one of the key features of our times, let us focus on how 
post-truth may connect with two other prominent features of our hypermodern 
times: hyperindividualism and hyperconsumption. In order to do so, we will at-
tend to one of the leading analysts of hypermodernity: the French philosopher 
and sociologist Gilles Lipovetsky.33
On the first place, Lipovetsky has always linked our hypermodern times with 
hyperindividualism.34 By this term he understands the loss of hard links among 
individuals, given that the traditional communities that could join them (class, 
religion, traditions…) are all of them declining forces in our Western world. This 
30 M. Perniola, Berlusconi o il ‘68 realizzato, Milan 2011, p. 26.
31 Ibid. p. 25.
32 Ibid. pp. 26–42, 45–49.
33 G. Lipovetsky, Les temps hypermodernes, Paris 2004.
34 G. Lipovetsky, Le bonheur paradoxal: essai sur la société d’hyperconsommation, Paris 2006.
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lack of binding memberships has positive, “emancipatory” aspects, no doubt, but 
also a frightening side: individuals are now completely responsible for their own 
lives, for their own successes but also for their own failures. They are alone in 
front of the world: that is what hyperindividualism means.
Now (and here is where our analysis starts), it does not seem strange that, in 
such an extremely competitive context35 as today’s world, this unbounded indi-
vidual is prone to reject also the last bind: the bind that connects him with truth. 
If truth impedes my ability to compete, why not reject it? If the liberation from 
every bind (with class, with religion, with traditions…) is emancipatory, why not 
emancipate ourselves as well from truth? In fact, we have seen that Vattimo ex-
plicitly uses this language of “emancipation” and “liberation” to refer to this loss 
of contact with factual truths. In sum, the road from hyperindividualism to post-
truth is an easy path, although it is not explicitly described with these words in 
Lipovetsky’s work.
We can see a  similar dynamic regarding a  second feature of hypermoder-
nity, according to Lipovetsky as well: hyperconsumption. If consumerism was 
defined as the continuous encouragement of new needs in the individual, “hy-
perconsumption” intensifies it by establishing an accelerated cycle of purchase, 
use and discard of more and more objects of consumption. “The hyperconsumer 
[…] wants constantly to experience new emotions through new goods”.36 This 
accelerated speed in replacing items (so different to the old-school habit of ap-
preciating an object more the older it gets37) establishes a new kind of relationship 
with things, with the others and with oneself38: everything is seen as ephemeral, 
misoneism is substituted by ageism, duration is not a plus but a minus, mobility 
trumps stability.
Now, could we connect this emergence of hyperconsumption with the suc-
cess of post-truth? It is clear that truth has always had characteristics quite alien 
35 Lipovetsky even uses the word “Stakhanovist” to describe it (ibid., p. 251); and cites “anxiety” as 
one of its typical emotions (G. Lipovetsky, The Hyperconsumption Society, in: Beyond the Con-
sumption Bubble, eds. K.M. Ekström and B. Glans, London 2011, p. 31).
36 Ibid., p. 30. An interesting fact in relation to this phenomenon is the one given by S. Kim and 
E. Paulos, Practices in the Creative Reuse of E-Waste, “CHI 2011”, Vancouver 2011, p. 2395: 77% 
of the 1.5 million Apple’s iPhone 4 sales on the first day of launch in June 2010 were upgrades 
purchased by existing iPhone owners, who presumably were replacing a still functioning device 
just for the enjoyment of buying a new one.
37 S. Alba-Rico, Las reglas del caos. Apuntes para una antropología del mercado, Barcelona 1995.
38 G. Lipovetsky, Le bonheur paradoxal: essai sur la société d’hyperconsommation, Paris 2006, p. 22.
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to the ones demanded by the hyperconsumerist individual: truth intends to be 
stable, truth remains the same in spite of the passing of time, truth should not 
be discarded when it does not fit our wishes anymore. At least this are the key 
characteristics of truth when it is understood as correspondence to the facts. It is 
hardly surprising, then, that in an age of hyperconsumption, truth is substituted 
by post-truth. If the whims of the consumer (“the customer is always right”) are 
supreme, then ancient and modern notions of truth as correspondence to the 
facts look too rigid: we need a more customable, adaptable notion of truth. And 
this role can be perfectly accomplished by post-truth. This is the way in which 
we can easily connect Lipovetsky’s insistence in hyperconsumerism, as we have 
already done with hyperindividualism, to post-truth as a feature of hypermodern 
times.
In fact, there is a  second trait of hyperconsumption that also fits very well 
with post-truth. Lipovetsky has insisted that, in hypermodernity, consumption 
no longer responds to traditional dynamics of distinction39: the way we consume 
nowadays does not establish hard differences in taste between social classes. We 
do not consume this or that in order to primarily show our belonging to a dis-
tinctive social group. Rather, it is just personal satisfaction what we are looking 
for.40 Now, whereas truth could have a  distinction role (that separates experts 
from amateurs, a connoisseur from an ignoramus), it is not so clear that it al-
ways carries good reasons for personal satisfaction too. This role can be much 
more efficiently filled by post-truth and its emotional sides. Certainly, the cost 
that post-truth pays for doing it is the loss of respect for experts that we have 
seen with Perniola: post-truth is hardly a reason for distinction between an ex-
pert and a neophyte. But in a world of hyperconsumption, as Lipovetsky insists, 
distinction is no longer such a highly demanded asset. Therefore, post-truth can 
perfectly substitute truth and all the distinctions that it carried along.
39 T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York 1899; P. Bourdieu, La distinction. Critique 
sociale du jugement, Paris 1979. Lipovetsky calls it “phase II” of consumerism: a phase that started 
around 1950 and lasted till the end of the 1970s. See G. Lipovetsky, The Hyperconsumption Society, 
in: Beyond the Consumption Bubble, eds. K.M. Ekström and B. Glans, London 2011, p. 26.
40 “Consumption for oneself prevails over competitive or conspicuous consumption”, ibid, p. 29. 
See also ibid, 27 and G. Lipovetsky, Le bonheur paradoxal: essai sur la société d’hyperconsomma-
tion, Paris 2006.
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Post-truth as a key to understanding our times
On the previous pages, we have seen that post-truth as a  thriving trend in 
our times was already announced by philosophers like Harry Frankfurt, Gianni 
Vattimo and Mario Perniola, starting in the 1980s (although they used different 
names and explanations for it). We have as well seen how post-truth is congruent 
with two of the main traits that Gilles Lipovetsky assigns to our present: hyper-
individualism and hyperconsumption. If we are correct in our analysis, then, 
there are philosophical reasons (alleged by Frankfurt, Vattimo and Perniola) and 
sociological reasons (alleged by Lipovetsky) for considering post-truth a typical 
feature of our hypermodern times.
Now, some may consider that such an analysis of post-truth remains on 
a  highly speculative level (on the side of the above cited philosophers) or on 
a too general level (on the side of Lipovetsky as a sociologist). Is it not possible to 
identify more concrete events in our times which corroborate this flourishing of 
post-truth? Do other disciplines (apart from philosophy and sociology) verify the 
relevance of post-truth for understanding today’s world? Although this is not the 
focus of this paper, we may argue that the answer to these two questions is yes. 
So, let us conclude by citing some of these more tangible experiences that validate 
post-truth a fact indispensible for understanding our hypermodern times.
Media analysis and International Relations provide us with some valuable 
hints of this kind. Let us focus on one of the trends of contemporary propaganda 
that is being more intensely studied in these academic disciplines: concretely, 
the kind of propaganda that the Russian Federation currently develops. Scholars 
have noticed that the Russian Government is deploying a quite original strategy 
in this sense: the main goal of its propaganda is not to convince people of some 
tenets anymore, as old propagandistic methods would have intended to do (tenets 
like: “Putin is a good ruler”, or “Russian interests are more legitimate that other 
countries’ interests”, etc.). In fact, this type of ideas would be difficult to directly 
introduce into the minds of Western individuals. Instead, the strategic move of 
the Kremlin nowadays just seeks to take advantage of “Western journalistic val-
ues of presenting a  plurality of views” in order to “conflate fact and fiction”41: 
41 A. Polyakova, M. Laruelle, S. Meister and N. Barnett, The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses, Washington 
2016, p. 3. See also P. Pomerantsev and M. Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin 
Weaponizes Information, Culture, and Money, New York 2014.
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it is not essential for this tactic to persuade us of this or that doctrine, but just 
to generate in us distrust towards Western media or politicians. Russian disin-
formation does not want us to believe something, but to have a general attitude 
of disbelief towards our institutions and values. Maybe we will not fully assent 
to Sputnik or RT’s42 often bizarre version of world affairs. But they can gener-
ate in us a similar skepticism towards everything that Western media might tell 
us about those affairs. Perhaps we will not submit to Russian authorities, but at 
least we will lose respect for any authoritative truths. In sum, this communica-
tion strategy that Russia promotes neatly identifies with what we have defined as 
“post-truth”.43
Similar strategies may be seen in populist movements all around the globe, as 
well as in nationalistic crusades. Populism can be described as an ideology that 
“pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 
‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the 
sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice”.44 Now, 
given that (quite often) available data do not support the populist claim that “the 
others” are depriving us, “the virtuous”, of wealth and rights, populist leaders 
often need to resort to disinformation, fake news and “alternative facts”45 in order 
to generate a distrust of data in general. Only after cutting the ties that link the 
public with truth, they can make their next move and get the power.46 Post-truth 
becomes then an indispensable tool for their ruling goals.
42 The news agency Sputnik and the TV channel RT (formerly known as Russia Today) have been 
described as two of the main tools of Russian propaganda addressed to the rest of the world: B. 
Nimmo, Propaganda in a New Orbit, Washington 2016; J. Ioffe, What is Russia Today, “Colum-
bia Journalism Review” 2010, September/October, https://archives.cjr.org/feature/what_is_rus-
sia_today.php?page=all.
43 On this use of propaganda not to convince us of something, but just to stabilize or destabilize 
authorities, see J. Stanley, How Propaganda Works, Princeton 2015. Although old media could 
hypothetically perform this role as well, new media (internet, social networks…) have clearly 
enhanced its possibilities to a previously never envisioned level; the documentary Factory of lies, 
by Jakob Gottschau (2018) offers a good perspective on this point.
44 D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell, Twenty-First Century Populism, London 2008, p. 3.
45 “Alternative facts” is the famous expression used by Donald Trump’s counselor Kellyanne Con-
way, when in January 2017 she tried to defend a false statement about the attendance numbers 
of the new president’s inauguration. As her interviewer Chuck Todd answered to her on that 
occasion, “Look, alternative facts are not facts. They’re falsehoods”. But Conway was precisely 
trying to go beyond the mere dichotomy between facts and falsehoods that Todd upheld; she 
was trying to lay the ground for post-truth.
46 See L. McIntyre, Post-truth, Cambridge MA 2018.
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The same tactics have been identified in nationalistic forces. During the Brexit 
campaign, when a  pro-leave supporter, the Tory politician Michael Gove, was 
faced with the economists’ consensus that leaving the EU would be harmful for 
Britain, he famously stated: “I think people in this country have had enough of 
experts”.47 It is hard to find a better summary of all the anti-intellectualism that 
Perniola pinpointed in post-truth. Another one of Perniola’s insights, that post-
truth would encourage contempt for higher education institutions,48 is recogniz-
able in the harassment that another nationalist leader, Viktor Orbán, is deploying 
against the Hungarian Academy of Sciences or against one of the top universities 
of his country, the Central European University.49 Finally, the role of the two 
typical tools for post-truth, disinformation and fake news, is well known in the 
shaping of a third nationalist movement of our days, the one supporting the se-
cession of Catalonia from the rest of Spain.50 
Concluding remarks
As all these examples taken from our geopolitical landscape show, the flour-
ishing of post-truth is not only an interesting position in our scholar discussions, 
but also a good interpretive key to understand world affairs in our hypermodern 
times. The bullshitting that Frankfurt keenly described, the nihilism that Vatti-
mo first praised and then disapproved of, the careless communication that Perni-
ola foresaw as an ever-increasing phenomenon of our times; in one word, the 
post-truth that academics have been analyzing for the last decades has jumped 
beyond their campuses and is now a key tool for politicians, propagandists and 
advisors. And two of the main features of our society that Lipovetsky has fa-
47 H. Mance, Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove, “Financial Times” 2016, June 6.
48 M. Perniola, Berlusconi o il ’68 realizzato, Milan 2011, p. 18–22.
49 Z. Csaky, The End of Viktor Orban’s Peacock Dance, “Foreign Policy” 2018, September 14 https://
foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/14/the-end-of-viktor-orbans-peacock-dance-hungary-eu-article-
7-epp-european-parliament 
50 A. Erickson, How fake news helped shape the Catalonia independence vote, “Washington Post” 
2017, October 19, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/19/how-
fake-news-helped-shape-the-catalonia-independence-vote/?utm_term=.4441b361383a; 
F.B. Lasheras and N. De Pedro, “Spain: the next target for Russian influence?”, in: A. Polyakova 
et al., The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses, 2, Washington 2017, pp. 20–25; R. de la Torre, Habrá que jurar 
que todo esto ha ocurrido, Madrid 2018.
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mously identified (hyperindividualism and hyperconsumption) are quite apt to 
give a further boost to this expansion of post-truth.
Should we join Frankfurt, Tesich, the later Vattimo and Perniola in the pessi-
mistic stance that they all take towards the propagation of post-truth? Or maybe 
Vattimo’s initial optimistic outlook is still available for us today? At this point 
it is assuredly useful to look back to a philosopher whose work precedes all the 
other authors we have dealt with insofar, but whose worries maybe were not very 
dissimilar. Her name was Hannah Arendt.
In fact, back in 1951, Arendt already warned us that every aspiring authori-
tarian can profit enormously of what we have identified as post-truth. Decades 
before the invention of the term, she seemed already to grasp the essence of the 
notion we have been talking about in this text:
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the con-
vinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fic-
tion (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false 
(i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.51
Such and early and clear warning by Arendt about the threats involved in 
post-truth does not look as an inappropriate coda to this paper.
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Summary
In this paper I  will defend the idea of the success of post-truth as one of the 
main features of hypermodernity. In order to understand such a claim, I will start 
by defining “post-truth” and showing the key differences that separate it from 
simple manipulation or lies. I will explain how post-truth characterizes a whole 
new way of understanding the difference between truth and falsity: a  new at-
titude of indifference to the sharp distinction that moderns and ancients had 
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placed between these two notions. I will contend that this new attitude had been 
announced by the work of at least three recent philosophers: Harry Frankfurt, 
Gianni Vattimo and Mario Perniola. They give different names to “post-truth”, 
though, and attribute it to different causes (from anti-intellectualism to the new 
media and to sheer carelessness). After that, I will explore how two key aspects 
of hypermodernity (according to Gilles Lipovetsky), i.e. hyperindividualism and 
hyperconsumption, cohere with this spread of post-truth. Finally, I will summa-
rily refer to some political and geopolitical events that corroborate the relevance 
of post-truth in our hypermodern world.
Keywords: hypermodernity, Gianni Vattimo, Harry Frankfurt, Mario Perniola, 
Gilles Lipovetsky, anti-intellectualism, social networks, hyperindividualism, hy-
perconsumption, disinformation, populism
Streszczenie
Post-prawda jako cecha hipernowoczesności
W artykule tym będę bronił tezy, że sukces post-prawdy jest jedną z głównych 
cech hipernowoczesności. By twierdzenie to uczynić jak nalepiej zrozumiałym, 
zacznę od zdefiniowania post-prawdy i pokazania, co odróżnia ją od prostej ma-
nipulacji oraz kłamstw. Wyjaśnię, jak post-prawda odnosi się do rozumienia 
różnicy między prawdą i  fałszem, wskazując na nowe podejście polegające na 
indyferencji wobec ostrego rozróżnienia, które starożytni i nowożytni wprowa-
dzili pomiędzy tymi dwoma pojęciami. Wykażę, że podejście to zostało już za-
powiedziane przez trzech współczesnych filozofów: Harry’ego Frankfurta, Gian-
niego Vattimo i Mario Perniolę, choć nazywali oni post-prawdę na różne sposoby 
i wskazywali różne jej przyczyny (od antyintelektualizmu, po nowe media i czy-
stą beztroskę). Następnie zbadam, jak dwa kluczowe aspekty hipermodernizmu 
(według Gillesa Lipovetsky’ego), mianowicie hiperindywidualizm i  hiperkon-
sumpcja, wiążą się z rozprzestrzenianiem się post-prawdy. Na koniec, pokrótce 
odniosę się do wydarzeń o charakterze politycznym i geopolitycznym, które po-
twierdzają, że post-prawda jest istotnym zjawiskiem hipernowoczesnego świata.
Post-Truth as a Feature of Hypermodern Times
Słowa kluczowe: hipernowoczesność, Gianni Vattimo, Harry Frankfurt, Mario 
Perniola, Gilles Lipovetsky, antyintelektualizm, sieci społecznościowe, hiperin-
dywidualizm, hiperkonsumpcja, dezinformacja, populizm
Miguel Ángel Quintana-Paz is a professor of Ethics and Social Philosophy at the 
European University Miguel de Cervantes (Valladolid, Spain), where he is cur-
rently the head of the Department of Humanities. He has been a Lonergan Fellow 
at the Boston College and a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Turin, 
under the direction of Gianni Vattimo. His last books (in Spanish) are Sapere 
aude, or is it possible to call ourselves enlightened yet? (2018) and Rules. An Essay 
of Introduction to Hermeneutics with Wittgenstein and Sherlock Holmes (2017).
